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INTEREST OF AMICI 
 Amici are law professors and practicing lawyers 
who study restitution, remedies, or both. One amicus 
was the Reporter for the Restatement (Third) of Resti-
tution and Unjust Enrichment, and eight served as 
Advisers or on the Members Consultative Group for 
that Restatement. Individual amici are further 
identified in the Appendix.1 
 If this Court were to adopt petitioner’s proposed 
rule — that a plaintiff who suffers no harm beyond the 
loss of his legal rights has no standing to sue — it 
could wreak havoc with the law of restitution and 
unjust enrichment, barring many long-established 
causes of action from federal courts. This important 
body of law long predates the American founding and 
serves essential functions, especially in private law 
but in parts of public law as well. 
   These amici take no position on the underlying 
statutory claim. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT  
 Petitioner’s sweeping and ill-defined argument 
that no plaintiff can have standing without proof of 
                     
1 This brief was prepared entirely by amici and their counsel. 
No other person made any financial contribution to its prepa-
ration or submission. Consent letters are submitted with the 
brief. 
The American Law Institute speaks only through its Restate-
ments and similar projects. Each such project is repeatedly 
revised in light of detailed reviews by multiple groups of judges, 
practitioners, and academics. Each position taken is supported 
by cases cited in the reporter’s notes. Finally, each project must 
be approved by the Institute’s governing Council and separately 
by its membership. This brief did not go through these processes; 
it is not a statement of the American Law Institute. 
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“concrete harm” is aimed at claims for statutory mini-
mum damages. The Court should reject this frontal 
assault on statutory remedies. But whatever the 
Court does with respect to statutory damages, it 
should take care not to inadvertently sweep away 
much of the law of restitution. 
 1. The law of restitution and unjust enrichment 
creates remedies and causes of action based on gain to 
defendant rather than loss to plaintiff. It follows that 
in appropriate cases, courts may impose liability for 
unjust enrichment even though the wrong that is the 
basis for plaintiff’s claim caused no harm. It is enough 
that defendant’s gain derived from a violation of 
plaintiff’s rights. Moreover, plaintiffs to whom a fidu-
ciary or confidential duty is owed can sue to set aside 
conflicted transactions without alleging or proving 
either damages to themselves or gain to defendant. 
Such remedies and causes of action have been part of 
Anglo-American law since before the American 
founding. 
 Only one person has standing to sue under the 
slayer rule, but that plaintiff need not even allege a 
violation of his own rights. There are also tort claims 
that are actionable without harm — trespass, tres-
pass to chattels, assault, battery, and false imprison-
ment. 
 Even more at odds with petitioner’s theory, private 
litigants at the founding could recover statutory 
damages or penalties in an action of debt, without 
proof of actual damages. 
 2. Standing necessarily depends on the relief 
sought. Plaintiffs may have standing to sue for dam-
ages but not standing to sue for an injunction, or vice 
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versa. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
And plaintiffs may have standing to sue for restitution 
of unjust enrichment without having standing to sue 
for damages or an injunction.  
 Standing to sue in unjust enrichment requires 
plaintiff to show that he is the source of defendant’s 
enrichment, either in the sense that he suffered a loss 
that corresponds to defendant’s gain, or in the sense 
that defendant’s gain was acquired by violating 
plaintiff’s rights. These rules are deeply embedded in 
the substantive law of restitution, and only occasion-
ally are they labeled as standing rules. But they serve 
the function of standing rules: they confine the right 
to sue to identifiable individuals with a concrete stake 
in the litigation. 
 Congress cannot authorize individual plaintiffs to 
enforce generalized rights that belong to the whole 
public. But Congress can create new individualized 
rights, and it can enact effective remedies for those 
rights. Standing to sue for statutory minimum 
damages requires violation of an individualized 
statutory right personal to plaintiff. The “injury in 
fact” that is “the irreducible constitutional minimum 
of standing” is “invasion of a legally protected interest 
which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual 
or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
Additional or consequential harms are not required.  
 3. Petitioner never specifies what it means by 
injury or harm. It acknowledges standing in many 
cases based only on violation of an individualized legal 
right, without proof of any further harm. It appears to 
say that standing on this basis is acceptable for 
common-law rights but not for statutory rights. Its 
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position reduces to little more than hostility to legis-
latures and to the statute it has allegedly violated. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Standing Often Does Not Require Plaintiffs 
to Establish Any Harm Beyond the Violation 
of Their Legal Rights. 
 As further explained in Part III, petitioner’s 
understandings of “injury” and “harm” are undefined, 
shifting, and inconsistent. But the heart of petitioner’s 
argument is that loss of respondent’s statutory rights 
is not an injury that will support standing. Some 
additional or consequential harm is required. Pet. Br. 
14-17. 
 Petitioner’s approach cannot even explain the law 
of damages. It is utterly inconsistent with the law of 
restitution and unjust enrichment.  
A. Restitution and Unjust Enrichment Is 
Based on Defendant’s Gain, Not Plaintiff’s 
Loss. 
 Compensatory damages, based on plaintiff’’s loss, 
and restitution of unjust enrichment, based on defen-
dant’s gain, are fundamentally distinct. See, e.g., 
Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson, 
534 U.S. 204, 215 (2002) (contrasting restitution with 
damages). The remedies and the causes of action have 
different conceptual bases, different histories, and dif-
ferent measures of recovery.  
 These differences are long established and uncon-
troversial. As summarized in the standard treatises, 
“[R]estitution is measured by the defendant’s gains, 
not by the plaintiff’s losses.” 1 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of 
Remedies §1.1 at 5 (2d ed. 1993). “[I]n the damage 
5 
 
action the plaintiff seeks to recover for the harm done 
to him, whereas in the restitution action he seeks to 
recover the gain acquired by the defendant through 
the wrongful act.” 1 George E. Palmer, The Law of 
Restitution §2.1 at 51 (1978). 
 Often, an unjust gain to defendant will be matched 
by a corresponding loss to plaintiff. If $100 is misap-
propriated, or paid by mistake, defendant has gained 
$100 and plaintiff has lost $100. But sometimes, 
plaintiff’s loss is smaller than defendant’s gain. And 
sometimes, plaintiff has no economic loss at all. Such 
a plaintiff may still have a claim in restitution, 
because the basis of the claim is defendant’s gain, not 
plaintiff’s loss. 
 The new Restatement summarizes the basic 
principle as its predecessors summarized it: “A person 
who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is 
subject to liability in restitution.” Restatement (Third) 
of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment §1 (2011) (here-
inafter Restatement (Third)).2 It further explains in 
the first paragraph of the first Comment: 
While the paradigm case of unjust enrichment 
is one in which the benefit on one side of the 
transaction corresponds to an observable loss 
on the other, the consecrated formula “at the 
expense of another” can also mean “in violation 
of the other’s legally protected rights,” without 
the need to show that the claimant has suffered 
a loss. See §3. 
Restatement (Third) §1 cmt. a (emphasis added). 
                     
 2 Accord, Restatement (Second) of Restitution §1 (Tentative 
Draft No. 1, 1983); Restatement of Restitution §1 (1937). 
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 Section 3, also closely tracking its predecessors, 
says simply that “A person is not permitted to profit 
by his own wrong.” The first Comment makes two 
important points about this principle. First: 
The present section marks one of the corner-
stones of the law of restitution and unjust 
enrichment. The general principle it identifies 
is the one underlying the “disgorgement” 
remedies in restitution, whereby a claimant 
potentially recovers more than a provable loss 
so that the defendant may be stripped of a 
wrongful gain. 
Id. §3 cmt. a.  
Second, the broad principle that no man may profit 
by his own wrong “identifies an outlook and an 
objective, not a cause of action.” Ibid. “Working rules” 
that define specific causes of action come in later 
sections.  
B. Many Familiar Causes of Action for 
Unjust Enrichment Do Not Require Plain-
tiffs to Establish Harm Beyond the Vio-
lation of Their Legal Rights. 
 Many familiar causes of action can support a resti-
utionary remedy in which plaintiff recovers defen-
dant’s unjust enrichment based on violation of a 
legally protected right, without the plaintiff having to 
establish any further harm. In some of these cases, it 
is clear that plaintiff suffered no harm beyond the loss 
of his rights. In others, plaintiff may or may not have 
suffered further harm, but he need not allege or prove 
any such harm. 
 A word about terminology: Some opinions rather 
clearly say that defendant’s violation of plaintiff’s 
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legal rights is an injury to plaintiff, even though plain-
tiff cannot establish any further harm. See, e.g., 
Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652, 654 (Wash. 
1946). These opinions define injury as violation of a 
right. In every case in which a person’s legal right is 
violated, he has lost at least the entitlement created 
by that right. 
 Other opinions equate injury with further or conse-
quential harm. These opinions rather clearly say that 
plaintiff can recover defendant’s unjust enrichment 
without proof of any injury. See, e.g., Jackson v. 
Smith, 254 U.S. 586, 589 (1921). The result is the 
same under either explanation: plaintiff can sue for 
defendant’s unjust enrichment without establishing 
any harm beyond the violation of his legal rights. 
1. Commercial Bribes and Kickbacks.  
An employer can recover any bribe or kickback 
paid to his employee, without establishing that the 
quality of the employee’s services or the terms of any 
transaction were actually affected. The rule is the 
same for a client who is entitled to honest and loyal 
services from a professional or a service provider. 
Restatement (Third) §43 illus. 17-19 & reporter’s note 
d; id. §44 illus. 9 & reporter’s note b; Restatement 
(Third) of Agency §8.02 and cmt. b (2006) (“it is not 
necessary that the principal show that the agent’s 
acquisition of a material benefit harmed the 
principal.”). 
 As the Minnesota court explained: 
 It matters not that the principal has 
suffered no damage or even that the trans-
action has been profitable to him. … 
 “Actual injury is not the principle the law 
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proceeds on, in holding such transactions void. 
Fidelity in the agent is what is aimed at, and, 
as a means of securing it, the law will not per-
mit him to place himself in a position in which 
he may be tempted by his own private interests 
to disregard those of his principal.”  
Tarnowski v. Resop, 51 N.W.2d 801, 803 (Minn. 1952) 
(quoting Lum v. McEwen (Lum v. Clark), 57 N.W. 662, 
662-63 (Minn. 1894)). 
 Governments are frequent plaintiffs in such cases. 
See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 305-09 
(1910); United States v. Podell, 572 F.2d 31, 34-35 (2d 
Cir. 1978). 
 2. Business Opportunities. 
Another example, with ancient roots, is trustees or 
agents who take for themselves business oppor-
tunities that might have been of interest to their bene-
ficiaries or principals. 
 This body of law appears to have been well 
established by the time of Keech v. Sandford, 25 Eng. 
Rep. 223 (Ch. 1726). A landlord refused to renew a 
lease to a trust for a minor; he then leased the 
property to the trustee individually. “[T]here was 
clear proof of the refusal to renew for the benefit of the 
infant,” id. at 223, and the Chancellor did not doubt 
the fact. So the minor had not lost the lease due to any 
action by the trustee. 
 The minor had suffered no harm unless violation 
of his right to the trustee’s undivided loyalty counts as 
harm. But the absence of harm could not change the 
result: “it is very proper that rule should be strictly 
pursued, and not in the least relaxed.” Ibid.  
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 From these beginnings, there has grown the whole 
modern law of corporate opportunities. Directors, offi-
cers, agents, partners, and the like cannot take for 
themselves a business opportunity that might have 
been of interest to their principal. Those who do are 
liable to the principal for all their profits from the 
opportunity. Plaintiff need not show that it would 
have invested in the opportunity itself, and therefore, 
it need not show that it was harmed. Restatement 
(Third) §43 illus. 14-15 and reporter’s note d; 
Restatement (Third) of Agency §8.02 and cmt. d and 
reporter’s note d; American Law Institute, Principles 
of Corporate Governance §5.05, §5.12, and reporter’s 
notes (1992). For modern variations on Keech, see 
Restatement (Third) §43 illus. 1 and reporter’s note b. 
 A famous illustration is Judge Cardozo’s opinion in 
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). The 
opportunity there was to take a lease on a much larger 
tract, for a much longer term, requiring much more 
capital, than the original lease in the joint venture 
between the parties. Id. at 545-46. But it was not for 
defendant to decide whether his joint venturer would 
have been willing and able to participate. “No answer 
is it to say that the chance would have been of little 
value even if seasonably offered.” Id. at 547. One who 
improperly takes a business opportunity for himself is 
liable for his profits, whether or not the victim was 
harmed. 
3. Other Conflicts of Interest. 
The rule that applies to bribes and kickbacks and 
to corporate opportunities applies with equal rigor to 
other transactions conducted under the potential 
influence of a conflict of interest. The principal or 
beneficiary in such a case can recover the unjust 
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enrichment of his agent or trustee without proof of 
harm. Or, because proof of defendant’s gain is often 
difficult, he can sue to rescind or set aside the trans-
action without proving either harm to plaintiff or gain 
to defendant. Restatement (Third) of Agency §8.01 
cmt. d(1) and reporter’s note d(1) (summarizing both 
remedies).  
 Thus, it is a settled rule, again with ancient roots, 
that a receiver or trustee of the assets of an insolvent 
debtor cannot buy at his own sale, even if the sale is 
conducted at public auction and the trustee is the high 
bidder. Restatement (Third) §43 illus. 20 & reporter’s 
note d; Whelpdale v. Cookson, 27 Eng. Rep. 856 (Ch. 
1747). 
 A revealing example in this Court is Jackson v. 
Smith, 254 U.S. 586 (1921). The Court said that “it 
affirmatively appears that the sale was fairly conduc-
ted, that there was competitive bidding, and that the 
property was finally knocked down to the highest 
bidder.” Id. at 587. But this high bidder was a group 
that included the trustee responsible for the sale, and 
the group went on to make profits with the property it 
had purchased. The Court unanimously held that the 
trustee and his confederates were liable “for all the 
profits obtained by him and those who were associated 
with him in the matter, although the estate may not 
have been injured thereby.” Id. at 589 (emphasis 
added). 
 Another striking example is Mosser v. Darrow, 341 
U.S. 267 (1951). There, the employees of a reorgani-
zation trustee traded in the securities of the enter-
prise undergoing reorganization. The trustee who 
employed them and allowed them to trade was held 
personally liable for their profits, although he had not 
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traded for his own account and had no improper 
profits of his own. The trustee argued that his 
employees had caused no loss, and even that their 
purchases of securities had supported the price and 
been beneficial to the reorganizing enterprise. Id. at 
272. The Court was not so sure of that, but its holding 
was that it did not matter. Id. at 273. The estate could 
recover the profits of a conflicted transaction, whether 
or not it had suffered any harm.  
 Another variation arises when an agent or trustee 
borrows assets of the principal or of the trust, and uses 
those assets to profit personally. The borrower is 
liable for his profits even if he repays the loan with 
interest and no harm is done. A clear example is Slay 
v. Burnett Trust, 187 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. 1945). The 
trustees borrowed money from the trust to invest per-
sonally in a speculative venture. They gave an 
interest-bearing note secured by oil and gas interests, 
id. at 385, and they had repaid most of the loan by the 
time of trial, id. at 387. Almost certainly the specu-
lative investment would have been inappropriate for 
the trust. But the trustees were liable to the trust for 
their profits, because they had improperly used trust 
assets to make these profits. Id. at 387-89. 
 Similarly if a corporate officer uses any of the 
corporation’s property for his own benefit, he is liable 
to the corporation for any resulting profit, whether or 
not the corporation is harmed. Principles of Corporate 
Governance §5.04(a), (c) and reporter’s note 2. 
4. Misuse of Confidential Information. 
 A person who misuses confidential information is 
liable for any profits he makes as a result — whether 
or not the person entitled to control the information 
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can show harm. An example in this Court is Snepp v. 
United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980), where a CIA agent 
published a book about his work without submitting 
the manuscript for review by the agency. The govern-
ment made no effort to prove damages. The Court 
believed the government had been harmed but that 
any damages were “unquantifiable.” Id. at 514. The 
Court granted a constructive trust over the profits 
from the book. 
 The rule is the same in more prosaic contexts such 
as trade secrets. One who misappropriates a trade 
secret is liable for his profits, whether or not plaintiff 
suffers any damages. Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
§3(a), 14 Unif. Laws Ann. 633 (2005). 
 Civil liability for insider trading depends on this 
principle. When the insider uses corporate infor-
mation to profit by trading in the corporation’s 
securities, the corporation can recover those profits 
without pleading or proving any harm. Diamond v. 
Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (N.Y. 1969); 
Restatement (Third) §43 illus. 9 and reporter’s note c; 
Principles of Corporate Governance §5.04(a), (c). The 
cause of action is to recover defendant’s profits, see, 
e.g., SEC v. Warde, 151 F.3d 42, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1998), 
and it is probably rare for the corporation to have any 
compensable loss. 
5. Forfeiture of Fees. 
An agent, attorney, or other person in a confi-
dential relationship who breaches a duty of loyalty 
may forfeit fees to which he would otherwise be 
entitled. Restatement (Third) of Agency §8.01 cmt. d(2) 
and reporter’s note d(2); Restatement (Third) of the 
Law Governing Lawyers §37 and reporter’s notes a, e 
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(2000). If the client has already paid those fees, he 
may sue to recover them. Id. cmt. a. The fiduciary 
would be unjustly enriched if he retained fees that he 
had forfeited by his disloyalty. 
 When the client sues to recover the fees, he need 
not show that the disloyal act caused harm. See, e.g., 
Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 237-40 (Tex. 1999); 
see id. at 239 nn.36-37 (collecting authorities). 
6. Infringement of Intellectual Property. 
One who infringes a copyright, trademark, or trade 
secret is liable for either his own profits or the victim’s 
losses. 17 U.S.C. §504(b) (copyright); 15 U.S.C. 
§1117(a) (trademark); Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
§3(a) (trade secret). Liability for profits has been 
repealed in patent infringement, 35 U.S.C. §284, 
except for design patents, §289, for policy reasons 
unrelated to standing. 
 If the infringer takes sales away from the victim of 
infringement, plaintiff will have losses and defendant 
will have gains that may be either more or less than 
plaintiff’s damages. Plaintiff can generally sue for 
whichever is larger. 
 If the infringer expands the market, or creates a 
derivative work that is infringing but not duplicative, 
he may earn substantial profits without causing 
plaintiff to lose any sales. In such a case, plaintiff can 
recover defendant’s profits without showing any 
harm. Restatement (Third) §42 illus. 7-9 and repor-
ter’s note g. 
 A copyright example is Three Boys Music Corp. v. 
Bolton, 212 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 2000), where defendant 
produced a hit song in 1991 that infringed another hit 
from 1964. The infringer was liable for the portion of 
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his profits attributable to the infringement. But it is 
hard to imagine that plaintiff lost any sales of its 1964 
song to a “similar” song in 1991. 
 A leading trademark example is Maier Brewing 
Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 390 F.2d 117 (9th 
Cir. 1968), where the sellers of an inexpensive beer 
copied the trademark of a well known scotch whisky. 
The infringers profited from their infringement, but 
plaintiff did not claim that it had lost any sales of 
whisky. Defendants plausibly argued that plaintiffs 
had shown “no injury to themselves, no diversion of 
sales from them to the appellants, no direct 
competition from which injury may be inferable.” Id. 
at 120. Even so, defendants had to disgorge their 
profits.  
 The leading case in this Court is Sheldon v. Metro-
Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390 (1940), where 
MGM plagiarized the script of a play and made a 
major movie. Damages to the copyright holder might 
have been zero, and were at most quite modest 
compared to the profits from the movie. The Court 
affirmed plaintiff’s judgment for 20% of the profits 
from the movie, based on the lower court’s estimate of 
the highest proportion of the profits that might 
possibly have been attributable to the script. Id. at 
408-09. 
 Recovery of the infringer’s profits is sufficiently 
settled that although this Court decides many 
intellectual property cases, it has not returned to 
issues of how to measure the profits. Sheldon cites 
numerous earlier cases. See also Petrella v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1967 & n.1, 
1973 (2014) (discussing the profits remedy in 
copyright); Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Manufac-
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turing Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203 (1942) 
(trademark). 
7. Trespass. 
A trespasser is liable for compensatory damages, 
for nominal damages in the absence of any actual 
damage, infra at 19, or for the profits of the trespass, 
Restatement (Third) §40 and reporter’s note c.  
 There are well known examples where the trespass 
was harmless, because plaintiff was not using his 
property or could not use his property. But he could 
still recover the trespasser’s profits. In Raven Red Ash 
Coal Co. v. Ball, 39 S.E.2d 231 (Va. 1946), defendant 
had an easement to build a railroad across plaintiff’s 
land and to transport coal mined from specified tracts 
of land. Without authorization, defendant also trans-
ported coal from additional tracts. Defendant argued 
that the only remedy should be nominal damages for 
the tort. The court disagreed, awarding instead the 
value of the benefit wrongfully acquired: 
To limit plaintiff to the recovery of nominal 
damages for the repeated trespasses will enable 
defendant, as a trespasser, to obtain a more 
favorable position than a party contracting for 
the same right. Natural justice plainly requires 
the law to imply a promise to pay a fair value of 
the benefits received. Defendant's estate has 
been enhanced by just this much. 
Id. at 238; Restatement (Third) §40 illus. 2. 
 Another well known example is Edwards v. Lee’s 
Administrator, 96 S.W.2d 1028 (Ky. 1936); Restate-
ment (Third) §40 illus. 4, §51 illus. 13. Edwards, who 
owned the mouth of the Great Onyx Cave, developed 
the cave as a tourist attraction. About one-third of the 
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cave was under Lee’s land — 360 feet below the 
surface and inaccessible to Lee. 96 S.W.2d at 1030. 
The court did not find any damages; instead, it 
awarded one-third of the profits from the cave. “[W]e 
are led inevitably to the conclusion that the measure 
of recovery in this case must be the benefits, or net 
profits, received by the appellants from the use of the 
property of the appellees.” Id. at 1032. Reviewing 
similar cases from various contexts, the court said: 
“The philosophy of all these decisions is that a wrong-
doer shall not be permitted to make a profit from his 
own wrong.” Ibid. 
8. Conversion. 
Similar facts can arise in conversion. Restatement 
(Third) §40 and reporter’s note d. A well known 
example is Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652 
(Wash. 1946). Defendant “borrowed” plaintiff’s 
egg-washing machine, without authorization, and 
used it in his business for more than three years until 
discovered. Plaintiff had stored the machine in space 
adjacent to defendant’s business, had no current use 
for it, and did not know it was missing. Defendant 
plausibly argued that plaintiff had suffered no loss.  
 The court said that the violation of plaintiff’s 
rights was in itself an injury. Id. at 654. But the 
remedy it affirmed was restitution, not damages: the 
court awarded defendant’s profits from using the 
machine. “To hold otherwise would be subversive of 
all property rights since his use was admittedly 
wrongful and without claim of right. The theory of 
unjust enrichment is applicable in such a case.” Ibid; 





  Rescission is another familiar restitutionary 
remedy that need not be accompanied by harm. If one 
party repudiates a contract, or substantially fails to 
perform, the other party is entitled to its money back, 
even if performance would have been worthless and 
contract damages would have been zero. Mobil Oil 
Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc. v. United 
States, 530 U.S. 604 (2000); Restatement (Third) §37 
illus. 1. After reviewing the underlying principles, 530 
U.S. at 607-08, the Court in Mobil turned to the facts. 
The government convincingly argued that Mobil had 
suffered no harm, but the Court said that did not 
matter. 
This argument, however, misses the basic legal 
point. The oil companies do not seek damages 
for breach of contract. They seek restitution of 
their initial payments. Because the Govern-
ment repudiated the lease contracts, the law 
entitles the companies to that restitution 
whether the contracts would, or would not, 
ultimately have produced a financial gain or led 
them to obtain a definite right to explore. If a 
lottery operator fails to deliver a purchased 
ticket, the purchaser can get his money back — 
whether or not he eventually would have won 
the lottery.  
Id. at 623-24. 
10. The Slayer Rule. 
If a person who would inherit property on the 
death of another feloniously kills that other person, 
the slayer does not get to keep the property he 
inherits. Restatement (Third) §45. The rule is the 
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same if the slayer would acquire the property through 
life insurance, joint tenancy, or any other means by 
which property passes at death. Ibid.  
 The property passes instead to the person next in 
line, usually the person who would have inherited the 
property if the slayer had predeceased the victim. 
§45(3). That person had no legally protected interest 
at common law, and very often, he has no compensable 
injury and no legally protected interest under the 
wrongful death act. He may be an adult child of the 
victim, a sibling, a nephew, or a third cousin once 
removed. If he was not financially dependent on the 
victim, and not on the short list of other potential 
plaintiffs listed in the wrongful death acts of some 
states, he cannot sue for damages. But he can recover 
the slayer’s unjust enrichment. 
 It is unimaginable that this body of law, partly 
judge-made and partly statutory, would be held 
unconstitutional. Yet the cause of action is vested in a 
substitute heir or beneficiary who often has suffered 
no legally cognizable harm. The purpose of the cause 
of action is to deprive the slayer of his unjust gains, 
the claim is vested in the most appropriate plaintiff, 
and that plaintiff has a concrete personal stake in the 
litigation. The slayer’s enrichment is at plaintiff’s 
expense only in the sense that this plaintiff will 
inherit if the slayer cannot. 
***** 
 The point of all these examples is that plaintiffs 
who suffered no harm beyond the violation of their 
legal rights can often sue to recover or prevent 
defendant’s unjust enrichment. Large, diverse, and 
important areas of law would be thrown into confusion 
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by an opinion suggesting that an unjust enrichment 
plaintiff must establish harm to have standing to sue 
in federal court.  
C. Some Torts Are Actionable for Damages 
Without Evidence of Harm Beyond the 
Violation of Plaintiff’s Rights. 
 As respondent explains, many common-law claims 
are actionable for damages without harm in peti-
tioner’s apparent sense of the word. Resp. Br. 16-22. 
We offer additional examples and authorities. “[A]ny 
intrusion upon land in the possession of another is an 
injury, and, if not privileged, gives rise to a cause of 
action even though the intrusion is beneficial, or so 
transitory that it constitutes no interference with or 
detriment to the land or its beneficial enjoyment.” 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §7 cmt. a (1965); see also 
id. reporter’s note d; id. §158, §163; 1 Dan B. Dobbs et 
al., The Law of Torts §56 at 149 (2d ed. 2011). 
 Similarly, the action for trespass to chattels will lie 
for temporary dispossession “although there has been 
no impairment of the condition, quality, or value of the 
chattel, and no other harm to any interest of the 
possessor,” and “he is not deprived of the use of the 
chattel for any substantial length of time.” 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §218 cmt. d. 
 False imprisonment is actionable if the plaintiff 
either “is conscious of the confinement or is harmed by 
it.” Id. §35(1)(c). 
 Assault is to intentionally cause apprehension of 
either “a harmful or offensive contact.” Id. §21(a). 
Battery can be either “a harmful or offensive contact 
with the person.” Id. §18(1)(a). And as Professor 
Dobbs reads the cases, “offensive” means no more 
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than without actual or apparent consent. Dobbs, Torts 
§33 at 81-82. The touching is offensive because 
defendant overrode plaintiff’s objection. 
 In each of these intentional torts to the person, 
plaintiff may “recover substantial as distinct from 
nominal damages” without proof of either physical 
harm or emotional distress. “The invasion of the 
plaintiff’s rights is regarded as a harm in itself and 
subject to an award of damages.” Id. §47 at 120. 
D. These Causes of Action Long Predate the 
American Founding.  
 Some of these claims, without harm in petitioner’s 
sense, long predate the American founding. Keech v. 
Sandford, supra at 8, holding a trustee liable for 
taking an opportunity that the trust could not have 
taken in any event, was decided in 1726. And the 
Chancellor treated the rule as already settled.  
 Whelpdale v. Cookson, 27 Eng. Rep. 856 (Ch. 1747), 
where a trustee was the high bidder at his own public 
sale, set aside the sale without proof of either harm to 
plaintiff or profit to the trustee. The facts are more 
fully stated in Whelpdale v. Cookson, 28 Eng. Rep. 440 
(Ch. 1747), where the reporter says that “This 
doctrine is not confined to Trustees, but extends to 
Assignees under Commissions of Bankrupt, Solicitors, 
Agents, and in short all persons having a confidential 
character,” citing numerous cases. Id. at 441. 
 The reporter also notes that the authority of 
Whelpdale had “been doubted” by Lord Eldon in Ex 
parte Lacey, 31 Eng. Rep. 1228, 1229 (Ch. 1802). Lord 
Eldon’s “doubt” was that Whelpdale had not gone far 
enough. Whelpdale said that a majority of the cred-
itors could ratify a sale to a trustee who bought at his 
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own sale. But Lord Eldon insisted that only unani-
mous consent of all the creditors could ratify such a 
sale. 
 The Chancellors discussed these cases as a recur-
ring problem. Those who had been deprived of their 
right to undivided loyalty could sue without more, 
because proof of actual injury or profit was too diffi-
cult. As Lord Eldon explained: 
[The rule] is founded upon this; that though you 
may see in a particular case, that he has not 
made advantage, it is utterly impossible to 
examine upon satisfactory evidence in the 
power of the Court, by which I mean, in the 
power of the parties, in ninety-nine cases out of 
an hundred, whether he has made advantage, 
or not. 
Lacey, 31 Eng. Rep. at 1229.  
 So the courts dispensed with proof of loss to 
plaintiff; they dispensed even with proof of gain to 
defendant. It was enough to support a cause of action 
that defendant violated a duty of loyalty. 
E. Founding-Era Plaintiffs Could Recover 
Statutory Damages or Penalties Without 
Evidence of Harm. 
 Even more fundamentally at odds with petitioner’s 
theory, statutes often enacted civil penalties for 
various wrongs. Private plaintiffs could recover these 
penalties in an action of debt. Tull v. United States, 
481 U.S. 412, 418 (1987); F.W. Maitland, The Forms 
of Action at Common Law 52 (1968 reprint) (debt 
“serves for the recovery of statutory penalties”).3 The 
                     
3 Tull cites Calcraft v. Gibbs, 101 Eng. Rep. 11 (K.B. 1792), 
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one “untranscendible limit” of an action of debt was 
that “the claim must be for a fixed sum.” Id. at 51. 
Plaintiffs in such cases could recover only the fixed 
statutory sum; any actual damages were irrelevant. 
 The First Congress provided that copyright 
holders could recover, in an “action of debt,” fifty cents 
for every infringing page found in an infringer’s 
possession. An Act for the Encouragement of Learning 
§2, 1 Stat. 124, 124-25 (1790). So the remedy applied 
only to pages that had not been sold or distributed. 
Plaintiff could also recover and destroy these pages, 
ibid, so they never would be sold or distributed. So it 
is not just that no harm was required. Resp. Br. 22-
23. These pages would never do harm, but plaintiff 
could recover the statutory sum in an action of debt. 
 Congress may have assumed that often there were 
other pages that had been sold, and that but for the 
lawsuit, some of the destroyed pages would have been 
sold. But Congress no doubt made similar assum-
ptions about the harm of publishing false information 
about individuals. Both statutes may have presumed 
harm, but neither required evidence of harm. 
F. Petitioner’s Proposed Rule — Especially If 
Broadly Stated — Would Disrupt Large 
Bodies of Long-Established Law.  
 All these causes of action — for restitution without 
harm, for damages without harm, for statutory 
penalties without harm — were part of “the 
traditional concern of the courts at Westminster.” Pet. 
                     
and Atcheson v. Everitt, 98 Eng. Rep. 1142 (K.B. 1775); see also 
Theodore F.T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 
363 (5th ed. 1956) (debt lay “to enforce various statutory 
penalties”); id. at 633 (same). 
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Br. 18. They present traditional cases and contro-
versies. 
 Petitioner rejects standing for any plaintiff who 
suffers no harm beyond the violation of his legal 
rights. This argument directly jeopardizes all statutes 
that provide minimum statutory recoveries. The 
danger to the law of restitution and unjust enrich-
ment lies in the potential breadth of an opinion 
adopting petitioner’s formulation of standing rules.  
Broadly stating petitioner’s rule would overturn 
centuries of Anglo-American law. All the cases 
discussed above would appear to be barred from 
federal court if this Court adopts petitioners’ 
argument. Where a restitution plaintiff could estab-
lish harm, the claim could proceed — but requiring 
such proof in a claim for restitution of unjust enrich-
ment would fundamentally change the lawsuit, 
adding a previously irrelevant issue to every 
plaintiff’s burden of proof. 
 Many federal claims would be barred or 
fundamentally changed — claims to recover bribes 
paid to federal employees; claims for infringement of 
copyright, trademark, and design patents; claims to 
recover the profits of insider trading; claims to recover 
insiders’ short-term profits; and more. Many state-law 
claims would be barred from the diversity jurisdiction. 
 Many states have similar standing rules for 
litigation in state court, often following or visibly 
influenced by this Court’s decisions. 4  Defendants 
would argue the persuasive value of this Court’s 
                     
4 A Westlaw search on September 4, 2015 revealed 749 state 
supreme court opinions discussing “standing” and “injury in fact” 
in the same paragraph. 
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decision in state court; every state would have to 
decide whether to preserve the traditional rules of 
restitution and unjust enrichment or to follow this 
Court’s lead and bar many such claims. Of course this 
Court is not responsible for state law. But the Court 
should think carefully before it bars many state-law 
claims from federal court and throws large swathes of 
state law into potential chaos. 
II. The Requirements of Standing Necessarily 
Depend on the Relief Plaintiff Seeks. 
 A plaintiff must show “that he has standing for 
each type of relief sought.” Summers v. Earth Island 
Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (citing City of Los 
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983)). This is 
because the relevant personal stake necessarily varies 
with the type of relief sought. There is no uniform rule 
of standing that applies without change to every type 
of relief. 
A. Standing in Suits for Damages and Injunc-
tions.  
In Lyons, plaintiff suffered damages when a 
policeman choked him, so he had standing to sue for 
damages. But he was not sufficiently threatened with 
a repetition to have standing to sue for an injunction. 
 Many cases are the reverse. A plaintiff who is 
threatened with unlawful conduct has standing to sue 
for an injunction, but no standing to sue for damages, 
because his rights have yet not been violated. Threat-
ened violation of a legal right is not injury in fact until 
or unless the right is actually violated. Plaintiffs in 
such cases have standing to sue for an injunction or 
declaratory judgment because they are threatened 
with injury that the court can prevent. See, e.g., Med-
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Immune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
B. Standing in Suits for Restitution and 
Unjust Enrichment.  
Just as standing to sue for damages is different 
from standing to sue for an injunction, so standing to 
sue for restitution of unjust enrichment is different 
from either. Because claims for unjust enrichment are 
based on defendant’s gains rather than plaintiff’s 
losses, a focus on harm asks the wrong question. The 
basis for standing in claims for restitution of unjust 
enrichment is that defendant was enriched “at the 
expense of” plaintiff, either in the sense of a corres-
ponding loss to plaintiff and gain to defendant, or in 
the sense that defendant’s profits were derived from a 
violation of plaintiff’s legally protected rights. Supra 
at 5. 
 This Court considered the standing question in 
Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115 (1991). Gollust was a 
suit to recover a corporate insider’s short-term trading 
profits under §16(b) of the Securities and Exchange 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §78p(b). The statute authorizes the 
issuer whose securities are illegally traded to recover 
these profits, and it authorizes holders of that issuer’s 
securities to recover the profits on behalf of the issuer 
if the issuer fails to act.  
 It is unlikely that the issuer is harmed when one 
of its officers or major shareholders buys and sells in 
a six-month period, and even less likely that any indi-
vidual security holder is harmed. Certainly no 
plaintiff is required to allege harm. The issuer has 
standing to sue because the statute creates the right; 
the statute creates the right because of the substan-
tial risk that defendant misused the issuer’s confi-
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dential information to produce his profits. Share-
holders have standing on the general principles of 
derivative suits. 
Gollust held that a derivative plaintiff in a §16(b) 
suit must continue to hold his securities in the issuer 
throughout the litigation. Otherwise, he would not 
have the necessary “personal stake” in the lawsuit 
that is essential to Article III standing. 501 U.S. at 
125-26. But this “personal stake” was not a matter of 
the derivative plaintiff establishing a likelihood, or 
even a possibility, that he was harmed. Plaintiff’s 
“personal stake” was that “respondent still stands to 
profit, albeit indirectly, if this action is successful.” Id. 
at 128. “[H]e retains a continuing financial interest in 
the outcome of the litigation derived from his stock in 
International’s sole stockholder, Viacom, whose only 
asset is International.” Id. at 127-28. The decision was 
unanimous. 
 To have standing to sue on a restitutionary claim 
for defendant’s wrongful profits, plaintiff had to have 
a personal stake in recovering defendant’s profits — 
not a personal stake in his own non-existent losses. 
Claims in restitution and unjust enrichment are 
based on defendant’s gains, and standing depends on 
plaintiff’s personal stake in those gains. 
 It does not follow that just anybody can create a 
personal stake by suing to recover a stranger’s unjust 
enrichment. The requirement that defendant’s gains 
be at plaintiff’s expense is deeply embedded in the law 
of restitution. It appears in the black letter of §1 of the 
Restatement (Third), and in the formulation of nearly 
every substantive rule of restitution and unjust 
enrichment. Even in the exceptional case of the slayer 
rule, courts carefully identify the appropriate plaintiff 
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entitled to inherit in lieu of the slayer — a choice that 
is easy in most cases but difficult in a few. Restatement 
(Third) §45(3) & cmt. d. Only that plaintiff can sue. 
Self-appointed plaintiffs without a personal stake 
cannot sue. 
 These rules requiring identification of the source 
of defendant’s enrichment, or the appropriate heir in 
the slayer-rule cases, control who can be a plaintiff. 
Usually lawyers and judges think of these rules as 
simply part of the substantive law of restitution and 
unjust enrichment — just as in compensatory dam-
ages cases, they are more likely to think of the 
requirement that plaintiff suffer damages as part of 
his substantive claim than as a standing rule. 
 But when the wrong plaintiff tries to sue, or when 
an unusual plaintiff asserts that special circum-
stances give him the right to sue, then the court may 
talk about the identity of the restitution plaintiff in 
terms of standing. An example is Fuchs v. Bidwill, 359 
N.E.2d 158 (Ill. 1976), where the court held that 
citizens and taxpayers lacked standing to sue on 
behalf of the state for restitution of corrupt profits 
allegedly earned by state legislators. Id. at 162. The 
state could have sued, but individual citizens and 
taxpayers could not. 
 Standing to sue depends on the “type of relief” 
sought. Summers, 555 U.S. at 493. The proper rule of 
standing in claims for restitution of unjust enrich-
ment is that plaintiff have a personal stake in defen-
dant’s gains, and in all but the exceptional case of the 
slayer rule, that defendant’s gains were acquired by 




C. Standing in Claims Specific to an Indi-
vidual Plaintiff or General to the Whole 
Public. 
 Restitution claims without harm, and tort claims 
without harm, are examples of standing based on 
violation of an individual legal right that is specific, or 
“particularized,” to the plaintiff. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 
560. In such a case, there is individualized injury in 
the loss of plaintiff’s individualized right. 
 The search for some injury or harm beyond the 
alleged violation developed in public-law cases where 
plaintiffs challenged government policies that did not 
actually apply to them. Thus in Summers, plaintiff 
sued to enjoin implementation of certain rules by 
which the Forest Service managed the national 
forests. In Lujan, plaintiffs challenged the govern-
ment’s failure to protect endangered species outside 
the United States. In Vermont Agency of Natural 
Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 
765 (2000), the Court held that a private plaintiff’s 
standing to recover damages suffered by the 
government depended on an implicit assignment from 
the government. But here too, plaintiff alleged only 
that a state agency had misreported labor costs to the 
federal government. Id. at 770. In these and many 
similar public-law cases, the challenged rule or 
practice did not regulate plaintiffs or interfere with 
any individualized right of plaintiffs. No right in any 
way personal or specific to plaintiffs had been 
violated. See Resp. Br. 35, 37. 
 Where the alleged violation is in no way personal 
to plaintiff, the Court’s cases require plaintiff to show 
that the violation caused a further individualized 
injury that is personal to plaintiff. Otherwise, plaintiff 
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would have no more standing to sue than any other 
American, and the concern with courts exercising a 
general power to supervise the political branches 
would be at its maximum. Congress cannot by statute 
confer on individuals the right to assert generalized 
grievances or enforce public rights that belong to the 
people as a whole. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74, 578. 
That is the principle on which petitioner relies. But 
this case does not fit within the principle.  
 What Congress can do is create new and individ-
ualized “legal rights, the invasion of which creates 
standing.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). 
The “injury in fact” that is “the irreducible constitu-
tional minimum of standing” is “invasion of a legally 
protected interest which is (a) concrete and partic-
ularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural 
or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (emphasis 
added; quotation marks omitted); see Resp. Br. 25. 
 We know petitioner understands the significance 
of this definition — because they changed it in their 
opening quotation. Petitioner substituted “harm” for 
“invasion of a legally protected interest,” placing 
“harm” just outside the quotation marks. Pet. Br. 2. 
But Lujan requires only “an invasion of a legally 
protected interest which is (a) concrete and 
particularized.” 504 U.S. at 560. It does not require 
additional or consequential harm. 
 Respondent claims a particularized statutory right 
not to have false consumer-credit information pub-
lished about him. The statute imposes liability for 
“willfully” failing to use “reasonable procedures to 
assure maximum possible accuracy of the information 
concerning the individual about whom the report 
relates.” 15 U.S.C. §1681n(a), §1681e(b) (emphasis 
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added). This right is “concrete and particularized,” 
and allegedly, it has been willfully violated. False 
consumer-credit information about respondent, pub-
lished in violation of that right, is injury in fact. This 
Court’s cases require no more. Petitioner cites no case 
in which the Court held that loss of such an 
individualized and personal right is insufficient to 
confer standing. 
 There is an unambiguous holding in Havens Realty 
Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982), where a tester 
inquired about the availability of apartments in 
defendant’s complex. As respondent explains, Resp. 
Br. 27-28, the decision rested squarely on the statu-
tory violation. “A tester who has been the object of a 
misrepresentation made unlawful under § 804(d) has 
suffered injury in precisely the form the statute was 
intended to guard against, and therefore has standing 
….” 455 U.S. at 373-74. The Court did not require 
some additional “concrete harm” to follow from loss of 
that statutory right. Plaintiff did not want an apart-
ment and had no use for truthful information. Peti-
tioner’s claim that the case depends on some special 
rule about “discrimination” as inherently injurious, 
whether or not it has any further consequences, Pet. 
Br. 41, has no basis in the opinion. What the Court 
unanimously held is that loss of an individualized 
statutory right, without more, is injury in fact. 
There is a less pointed illustration in Clapper v. 
Amnesty International USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
Plaintiffs alleged that government surveillance of 
foreigners created a substantial risk that plaintiffs’ 
international communications would be unconstitu-
tionally intercepted. The Court held that this risk was 
too speculative to support standing. But the issue was 
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simply the certainty or substantiality of the threat 
that a communication would be intercepted. The 
Court did not suggest that an individual whose 
communications were sufficiently threatened with 
interception would also have to show that he would 
suffer some further harm resulting from that inter-
ception. The Fourth Amendment right to security in 
one’s own communications is an individualized right, 
and violation of that right would be injury in fact. 
 Just as Congress can enact new individualized 
rights, so it can make those rights enforceable. Where 
compensatory damages are often small or hard to 
quantify, legislatures may authorize statutory mini-
mum damages so that individuals will have a work-
able remedy when their rights are violated. Standing 
in such cases depends on a claim that plaintiff’s 
individualized right was violated — that he lost that 
to which he was personally entitled under the statute 
— and that he satisfies any other prerequisites to the 
statutory remedy. The prerequisites to standing to 
seek this statutory remedy depend on the elements of 
the statutory claim, just as the prerequisites to 
standing to seek compensatory damages, injunctions, 
or restitution depend on the elements of those claims. 
What standing for all these remedies has in common 
is an actual or threatened “invasion of a legally 
protected interest which is … concrete and partic-
ularized.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.  
III. Petitioner Obfuscates What It Means by 
Injury and Harm. 
 Petitioner argues that plaintiffs who suffer no 
“concrete harm” have no standing to sue in federal 
court, even if their individual rights were violated. 
But petitioner never defines “harm.” Petitioner obfus-
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cates the meanings of “injury” and “harm” in 
unsuccessful efforts to hide the radical implications of 
its proposed rule and to distinguish the many cases 
that do not fit that rule. 
Petitioner tries to explain away a few of the causes 
of action reviewed in part I of this brief. It ignores all 
the others. The heart of its argument is that loss of 
plaintiff’s statutory right, without more, is not 
“concrete harm.” Pet. Br. 14-17.  
But then petitioner says that violation of rights 
under a contract, without more, is concrete harm. Id. 
at 26. Violation of rights under a trust, without more, 
is concrete harm. Ibid. Petitioner’s apparent reason is 
that these rights were created by judges, not legis-
latures.  
And then petitioner concedes that some statutory 
rights are also actionable without any harm beyond 
the violation of the right. Petitioner says that infrin-
gement of copyrights and patents, without more, is 
concrete harm, because those statutory rights built on 
older common-law rights. Id. at 46 n.9, 49. Petitioner 
appears to concede that plaintiffs under the Freedom 
of Information Act need show only that they “sought 
and were denied specific agency records” — not that 
failure to get the records would cause some further 
harm. Id. at 43 (quoting Public Citizen v. United 
States Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449 
(1989)). That statutory right is said to build on 
mandamus. Pet. Br. 44.  
But when Congress creates a new right not 
sufficiently “rooted in the common law,” that is a mere 
“fiat.” Id. at 16, 46 n.9, 49. Loss of that statutory right 
is not an injury; plaintiffs must show some further 
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harm, apparently some consequential damage from 
the loss of their statutory right. 
Nothing underlies this distinction between 
common-law and statutory rights but hostility to 
Congress. Judges create real rights, loss of which is an 
injury, but the elected representatives of the people 
cannot create such rights. This distinction has no 
possible justification. “[T]here is absolutely no basis 
for making the Article III inquiry turn on the source 
of the asserted right.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576. 
Petitioner is forced to offer other ad hoc distinc-
tions as well. It says that trespass to land is actionable 
without concrete harm because repeated trespasses 
might eventually create an easement. Pet. Br. 25-26. 
But plaintiff can recover for a single trespass; proof 
that defendant threatens to repeat the trespass is 
required only if plaintiff seeks an injunction. See 
Dobbs, Torts, §56 at 148-49. The prospect of continued 
controversy is sometimes what motivates plaintiff to 
sue, but continuing controversy has never been a 
prerequisite to the claim.  
To explain damages for loss of the right to vote, 
petitioner implausibly claims that voting is a property 
right. Pet. Br. 25; but see Resp. Br. 18-19.  
Petitioner misdescribes Havens Realty, empha-
sizing a harm the Court never mentioned to avoid 
recognizing the loss of the statutory right to truthful 
information that the Court relied on. See supra at 30.  
Petitioner also misstates Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 
247 (1978), implying that standing to sue for nominal 
damages depended on plaintiffs’ allegations that they 
lost “educational benefits” when they were suspended 
from school without due process. Pet. Br. 46 n.9. Not 
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so. If a hearing would have prevented plaintiffs’ 
suspensions, they could have recovered actual 
“damages to compensate them for the injuries caused 
by the suspensions.” 435 U.S. at 260. Nominal 
damages were authorized on the explicit assumption 
that there was no such loss. Id. at 266. “[T]he denial 
of procedural due process should be actionable for 
nominal damages without proof of actual injury.” Ibid. 
Violation of plaintiffs’ individualized right to due 
process — and nothing more — supported the claim. 
To mask the radical implications of its proposed 
rule, petitioner finds harm in bare violations of law in 
various cases that it cannot distinguish — contract, 
trust, trespass, patent, copyright, discrimination, 
FOIA. Petitioner concedes that violation of these legal 
rights, without more, is concrete harm and injury in 
fact. 
But petitioner cannot explain why violation of 
respondent’s individualized right is not injury in just 
the same way. Respondent alleges that petitioner 
willfully failed to follow reasonable procedures to 
assure the accuracy of its information and that conse-
quently, it published “information” that specifically, 
individually, and falsely described respondent. 
Congress created a statutory right that protects 
individuals from such false publications about them; 
violation of that right is an injury in fact. All that 
petitioner ultimately appears to say is that legis-
latively created rights are an inferior set of rights that 
do not count. 
There is no difference in the magnitude of the 
interests at stake. An individual may well care more 
about Spokeo publishing false but arguably positive 
credit and employment information about him to the 
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whole world than he cares about a trespasser’s 
harmless entry upon his land. An applicant can lose 
the job for being over-qualified; a suitor can lose a 
woman if she reads that he is married. When all the 
obfuscation and fallacious distinctions are stripped 
away, petitioner’s argument boils down to hostility to 
Congress and to its view that the individual right 
Congress created is not worth protecting. This is an 
objection to the statutory remedy. It is not an 
argument about standing. 
CONCLUSION 
 The judgment below should be affirmed. And the 
Court’s opinion should take care to preserve the long-
established law of restitution and unjust enrichment. 
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